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The History of Alimony in Pennsylvania: A Need
for Further Change
I.

INTRODUCTION

Alimony was unknown at the common law. It originated in England as a device used by the ecclesiastical courts to enforce a husband's duty to support his wife. Jurisdiction over marriage was reserved to the ecclesiastical courts which applied canon law.' Under
canon law, marriage was considered a sacrament which was indissoluble by human authority. Absolute divorce, or a divorce a
vinculo matrimonii, wherein the marital relationship was dissolved, therefore, was forbidden.2 The ecclesiastical courts did,
however, grant a partial divorce called a divorce a mensa et thoro
or a divorce from bed and board. Although in form a partial divorce, a bed and board divorce was in substance merely a court
ordered separation. Under a decree of divorce from bed and board,
the wife was relieved of her marital obligation to cohabit with her
husband. The marital relationship and all other obligations which
arose out of it survived the decree. The husband's obligation to
support his wife was one of the marital obligations to survive the
decree, and it served as the basis for an award of alimony to the
wife.
In Pennsylvania, alimony has evolved from a device used by the
Courts to enforce a husband's obligation to support his wife into a
device used by the courts to effectuate economic justice between
the parties when dissolving a marital relationship. Alimony is statutory and constitutes an extension of the obligation of spousal support beyond the dissolution of the marital relationship. Under the
current Pennsylvania statute, alimony may be awarded in conjunction with the granting of an absolute divorce if the court finds alimony to be necessary.4 Such an award of post-divorce alimony may
or may not be limited in duration depending upon the particular
1. See Jones v. Jones, 12 Pa. 350 (1849).
2. See Moore v. Moore, 64 Pa. Super. 192, 194 (1916).
3. See Clark v. Clark, 6 Watts & Serg. 85, 87 (Pa. 1843).
4. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989) provides: "Where a divorce
decree has been entered, the court may allow alimony as it deems reasonable, to either
party, only if it finds that alimony is necessary." Id.
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circumstances.
This comment will trace the history and evolution of alimony in
Pennsylvania. The focus will be on the entitlement, duration, and
conditions attached to an award of alimony.
II.

THE HISTORY OF ALIMONY IN PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvania's first general divorce law was enacted in 1785.6
Under the 1785 Act, courts were authorized to decree absolute divorces and divorces from bed and board based on various fault
grounds.1 In the event of an absolute divorce, there was no provision in the 1785 Act for post-divorce alimony. There being no common law basis for an award of post-divorce alimony, a statutory
basis was necessary. A decree of absolute divorce terminated the
duties and rights arising out of the marital relationship, including
the husband's duty to support his wife. There being no statutory
basis for an award of alimony and no duty of support upon which
5. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501(c) (Purdon Supp. 1989) provides: "The court in ordering alimony shall determine the duration of the order which may be for a definite or
indefinite period of time which is reasonable under the circumstances." Id.
6. Act of September 19, 1785, 1785 Pa. Laws 343, 2 Sm. L. 343, 12 Pa. Stat. 194 (hereinafter "1785 Act").
7. Section II of the 1785 Act provided:
Be it enacted, and it is hereby enacted by the Representatives of the Freemen of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in General Assembly met, and by the authority of
the same, That where a marriage hath been heretofore or shall hereafter be contracted and celebrated between any two persons, and it shall be adjudged, in the
manner hereinafter mentioned, that either party at the time of the contract was and
still is naturally impotent or incapable of procreation, or that he or she hath, knowingly, entered into a second marriage, in violation of the previous vow he or she made
to the former wife or husband, whose marriage is still subsisting, or that either party
hath committed adultery, or wilful and malicious desertion and absence, without a
reasonable cause, for and during the term and space of four years, in every such case
it shall and may be lawful for the innocent and injured person to obtain a divorce,
not only from bed and board, but also from the bond of matrimony itself.
Id.
8. Section VI of the 1785 Act provided:
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That it shall and may be lawful
for the said Supreme Court, after hearing any cause commenced before them by virtue of this act, to determine the same, as to law and justice shall pertain, by either
dismissing the petition or libel, or sentencing and decreeing a divorce and separation
from the nuptial ties or bonds of matrimony, or that the marriage is null and void,
agreeably to the prayer thereof; and that after such sentence, nullifying or dissolving
the marriage, all and every the duties, rights and claims, accruing to either of the said
parties, at anytime theretofore, in pursuance of the said marriage, shall cease and
determine, and the said parties shall severally be at liberty to marry again, in the like
manner as if they never had been married.
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to base such an award, the courts were without authority to award
alimony following an absolute divorce. In the event of a divorce
from bed and board, the courts had discretion to award alimony to
the wife and to enforce her husband's duty to support her.' The
amount of alimony awarded to the wife was to be determined
based upon her needs and the husband's ability to pay, limited to
no more than one third of the husband's income. The order for
alimony remained within the control of the court which, upon sufficient cause shown, could modify the amount of alimony.'
The duration of an award of alimony made in conjunction with a
bed and board divorce under the 1785 Act was indefinite. It was,
however, subject to termination in the event of a reconciliation between the parties." It was subject to suspension in the event the
husband filed before the court his good-faith offer of reconciliation. 2 If the wife refused such an offer, it was within the court's
discretion to terminate any award of alimony.' If the wife accepted such an offer, and the husband failed to fulfill his obligations, the court was authorized to revive the suspended obligation
to pay alimony and to order that the arrears of alimony be paid.'4
Alimony awarded under a decree of divorce from bed and board
could be terminated by a subsequent absolute divorce which would
9. Section X of the 1785 Act provided:
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That if any husband shall, maliciously, either abandon his family or turn his wife out of doors, or by cruel and barbarous treatment endanger her life, or offer such indignities to her person, as to render
her condition intolerable, or life burthensome, and thereby force her to withdraw
from his house and family, it shall and may be lawful for the Supreme Court, upon
complaint and due proof thereof in manner aforesaid, at the first or any subsequent
term, to grant the wife a divorce from bed and board; and also to allow her such
alimony as her husband's circumstances will admit of, so as the same does not exceed
the third part of the annual profits or income of his estate, or of his occupation or
labour; or to decree but one of them, as the justice of the case shall require; which
shall continue until a reconciliation shall take place, or until the husband shall, by his
petition or libel, offer to receive and cohabit with her again, and to use her as a good
husband ought to do; and then, in such case, the court may either suspend the aforesaid sentence or decree, or, in case of her refusal to return and cohabit under the
protection of the court, to discharge and annul the same, according to their discretion; and if he fail in performing his said offers and engagements, the former sentence
or decree may be revived and enforced, and the arrears of the alimony ordered to be
paid.
Id.
10. Mclurg's Appeal, 66 Pa. 366, 374 (1870); Betz v. Betz, 70 Pa. Super. 396 (1918).
11. See supra, note 9. See also M'Karracher v. M'Karracher, 3 Yeates 56, 57 (Pa.
1800); Tiffin v. Tiffin, 2 Binn. 202, 207 (Pa. 1809).
12. See supra, note 9. See also Thompson v. Thompson, 2 Dall. 128 (Pa. 1791).
13. Kinsey v. Kinsey, 1 Yeates 77, 78 (Pa. 1791).
14. See supra, note 9.
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dissolve the marital relationship and the husband's derivative obligation to support his wife, thereby removing the basis for any
award of alimony.
The 1785 Act was repealed in .1815.11 The 1815 Act did not provide for divorce from bed and board. It provided only for absolute
divorce."6 The 1815 Act made no provision for an award of alimony
in conjunction with an absolute divorce. The provision of bed and
board divorce and concomitant alimony as contained in the 1785
Act 17 were re-enacted in 1817.18 Any award of alimony made in
conjunction with a decree of divorce from bed and board under the
1817 Act remained subject to modification by the court upon sufficient cause shown. 9
In 1854, Pennsylvania's divorce law was amended to provide that
a husband could seek an absolute divorce from his wife based on
the ground of cruel and barbarous treatment on the condition that
the wife be awarded permanent alimony.20 The amount of permanent alimony awarded to the wife was based upon her needs and
the husband's ability to pay.21 This amendment was significant in15. Act of March 13, 1815, 1815 Pa. Laws 150, P.L. 150, 6 Sm. L. 286 (hereinafter
"1815 Act").
16. Section I of the 1815 Act provided:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, in General Assembly met, and it is hereby enacted by the authority of
the same, That when a marriage hath been heretofore, or shall hereafter be contracted and celebrated between any two persons, and it shall be judged in the manner
herein after mentioned, that either party, at the time of the contract, was and still is
naturally impotent or incapable of procreation, or that he or she hath knowingly entered into a second marriage, in violation of the previous vow he or she made to the
former wife or husband, whose marriage is still subsisting, or that either party shall
have committed adultery, or wilful and malicious desertion and absence from the
habitation of the other, without a reasonable cause, for and during the term and
space of two years, or when any husband shall have, by cruel and barbarous treatment, endangered his wife's life, or offered such indignities to her person, as to render
her condition intolerable and life burthensome, and thereby force her to withdraw
from his house and family, in every such case it shall and may be lawful for the
innocent and injured person to obtain a divorce from the bond of matrimony.
Id.
17. See supra, note 9.
18. Act of February 26, 1817, 1817 Pa. Laws 67, P.L. 67, 6 Sm. L. 405 (hereinafter
"1817 Act").
19. See Edgar v. Edgar, 23 Pa. Super. 220, 222-23 (1903).
20. Act of May 8, 1854, 1854 Pa. Laws 644, P.L. 644, No. 629 (hereinafter "1854 Act").
See generally, Shoop's Appeal, 34 Pa. 233 (1859); Gordon v. Gordon, 48 Pa. 226 (1864).
21. Paragraph III of Section I of the 1854 Act provided:
Where the wife shall have, by cruel and barbarous treatment, rendered the condition
of her husband intolerable, or life burdensome: Provided, that in cases of divorce
under this act, if the application shall be made on the part of the husband, the court
granting such divorce, shall allow such support or alimony to the wife, as her hus-
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sofar as it was the first time in Pennsylvania that alimony was
available in conjunction with the granting of an absolute divorce.
The husband's marital obligation to support his wife was statutorily extended beyond the dissolution of the marital relationship.
Alimony was made an incident of absolute divorce as a complete
matter of right. The policy behind this requirement of post-divorce
alimony favored leaving the duty of supporting the wife on the
husband rather than having the public assume it.22 In 1895, the
award of alimony to the wife when her husband was granted an
absolute divorce on the ground of cruel and barbarous treatment
was made discretionary with the court.2" Indignities was added as
an additional ground upon which a husband could seek an absolute
divorce. An award of alimony to the wife was within the court's
discretion for absolute divorces granted a husband based upon this
additional ground.24 Under the 1895 Act, alimony was changed
from a complete matter of right to a right solely contingent upon
the discretion of the court.
In 1905, the right to an absolute divorce from a lunatic spouse
was provided to either party to a marriage. 5 If the husband sought
an absolute divorce from his insane wife, he could be required to
pay alimony for her support.2 6 If the wife sought an absolute divorce from her insane husband, and his estate was insufficient for
his support but the wife had sufficient means, she could be reband's circumstances will admit of, and as the said courts may deem just and proper.
Id.
22. Miles v. Miles, 76 Pa. 357, 358 (1874) ("He may dissolve the tie which binds him to
her alone, so far as it makes his condition intolerable and his life burdensome, but as the
head of the family and the maker of its wealth, he is not to be relieved from a duty which
humanity and the rights of society demand him to fulfill.").
23. Act of June 25, 1895, 1895 Pa. Laws 308, P.L. 308, No. 226 (hereinafter "1895
Act").
24. Id. See also Parker v. Parker, 35 Pa. Super. 341, 342-43 (1908).
25. Act of April 18, 1905, 1905 Pa. Laws 211, P.L. 211, No. 152 (hereinafter "1905
Act").
26. Section I of the 1905 Act pertinently provided:
In case of the application of the husband for divorce from an insane wife, under the
provisions of this act, the courts of common pleas of this commonwealth, or the
judges thereof to whom application is made, are hereby vested with full and complete
authority to provide alimony for the support of such insane wife during the term of
her natural life, by requiring the petitioner to file a bond, with surety or sureties if
necessary, in such sum as they may direct, conditioned as aforesaid, before granting
the divorce prayed for. And if the wife be the petitioner, and have sufficient means,
the courts aforesaid, or the judges thereof, may provide for the support of the insane
husband as in this section required for an insane wife; provided the insane husband
has not sufficient estate in his own right for his support.
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quired to pay alimony for his support.2 7 The distinction drawn by
the 1905 Act regarding the awarding of alimony was a legislative
recognition of the obligation of the husband to support his wife
even though his wife was possessed of individual means sufficient
for her support. 28 The obligation to provide alimony for the support of an insane spouse was permanent. 29 The obligation to pay
alimony was suspended by the mental recovery of the insane
spouse and, once suspended, it was revived by any subsequent
reoccurrence of mental illness.3 0
In 1925, the right of the wife to an award of alimony in conjunction with an absolute divorce granted the husband on the grounds
of cruel and barbarous treatment or indignities was removed.31 The
removal of the right of the wife to alimony was intended as a step
toward equality between spouses in divorce litigation.2 An award
of alimony to the wife following an absolute divorce was considered
inconsistent with the dissolution of the marital relationship and
the termination of its derivative obligations.
The 1815 Act, as amended and supplemented, continued to be
the law in Pennsylvania concerning divorces and alimony until the
enactment in 1929 of a new divorce code.33 The 1929 Act made
little change in the substance of the prior law. Its purpose was to
codify and restate the then existing laws concerning divorce and
alimony. 4 Under the 1929 Act, alimony was available at the court's
discretion to the wife upon the granting of a divorce from bed and
board, 35 and to either party if, while insane, their spouse was
27. Id.
28. Hedderick v. Hedderick, 163 Pa. Super. 564, 566 (1949).
29. Hickey v. Hickey, 158 Pa. Super. 511, 514 (1946).
30. See Emerick v. Emerick, 116 Pa. Super. 241, 244 (1935).
31. Act of April 4, 1925, P.L. 124, No. 90.
32. See Hooks v. Hooks, 123 Pa. Super. 507, 512 (1936).
33. Act of May 2, 1929, P.L. 1237, No. 430 (hereinafter "1929 Act").
34. See Stump v. Stump, 111 Pa. Super. 541, 544-45 (1934).
35. Section 47 of the 1929 Act pertinently provided:
Alimony in Divorce From Bed and Board.- In cases of divorce from bdd and board,
the court may allow the wife such alimony as her husband's circumstances will admit
of, but the same shall not exceed the third part of the annual profit or income of his
estate, or of his occupation and labor, which allowance shall continue until a reconciliation shall take place, or until the husband shall, by his petition or libel, offer to
receive and cohabit with her again and to use her as a good husband ought to do; and
then in such case the court may either suspend the aforesaid decree, or, in case of her
refusal to return and cohabit under the protection of the court, discharge and annul
the same according to its discretion; and, if he fail in performing his said offers and
engagements, the former sentence or decree may be revived and enforced, and the
arrears of the alimony ordered to be paid.
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granted an absolute divorce.36 In either instance where alimony
was awarded, the award of alimony remained within the control of
the court and subject to modification upon sufficient cause
shown.3 7 Alimony was otherwise unavailable upon the granting of
an absolute divorce.3 a Except in cases of insanity, an obligation to
pay post-divorce alimony for the support of a former spouse could
be created only by contract. 9
The 1929 Act governed divorce and alimony in Pennsylvania until 1980 when the General Assembly enacted a new divorce code.40
The 1980 Act reflected a fundamental change in policy concerning
both divorce and alimony.4 1 There was no provision for a bed and
Id.
36. Section 45 of the 1929 Act provided:
Permanent Alimony Where Respondent Insane.- In case of the application of a husband for a divorce from an insane wife, the court, or the judge thereof to whom the
application is made, shall have power to decree alimony for the support of such insane wife during the term of her natural life, by requiring the libellant to file a bond,
with surety or sureties if necessary, in such sum as he or it may direct, conditioned as
aforesaid, before granting the divorce.
If the wife be the petitioner, and have sufficient means, the court, or the judge, may
provide for the support of the insane husband, as provided in this section for an
insane wife, if the insane husband has not sufficient estate in his own right for his
support.
Id.
37. Marra v. Marra, 170 Pa. Super. 588, 593-94 (1952) (citations omitted).
38. Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 458 Pa. 147, 156 (1974) (citations omitted).
39. See generally, Com. ex rel. Cook v. Cook, 303 Pa. Super. 61, 66-68 (1982).
40. Act of April 2, 1980, P.L. 63, No. 26, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 101 et seq. (Purdon
Supp. 1980)(hereinafter "1980 Act").
41. Section 102 of the 1980 Act, entitled Legislative findings and intent, provided:
(a) The family is the basic unit in society and the protection and preservation of the
family is of paramount public concern. Therefore, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to:
(1) Make the law for legal dissolution of marriage effective for dealing with the
realities of matrimonial experience.
(2) Encourage and effect reconciliation and settlement of differences between
spouses, especially where children are involved.
(3) Give primary consideration to the welfare of the family rather than the
vindication of private rights or the punishment of matrimonial wrongs.
(4) Mitigate the harm to the spouses and their children caused by the legal
dissolution of the marriage.
(5) Seek causes rather than symptoms of family disintegration and cooperate
and utilize resources available to deal with family problems.
(6) Effectuate economic justice between parties who are divorced or separated
and grant or withhold alimony according to the actual need and ability to pay
of the parties and insure a fair and just determination and settlement of their
property rights.
(b) The objectives set forth in subsection (a) shall be considered in construing provisions of this act and shall be regarded as expressing the legislative intent.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (Purdon Supp. 1980 (amended 1988)).
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board divorce. The courts were authorized to grant only absolute
divorces.4 An absolute divorce could be granted to either party
based upon the traditional fault grounds or upon no-fault
grounds. s An award of alimony was within the court's discretion
and available to either party upon the granting of an absolute divorce subject to certain prerequisites and conditions.44
A major innovation contained in the 1980 Act was the provision
of rehabilitation alimony. 45 An award of alimony was rehabilitative
when it was awarded for a limited period of time sufficient to enable the recipient to become self supporting. 46 This was in sharp
contrast to the predecessor of rehabilitation alimony, permanent
alimony, which was based upon the ascribed expectations of the
parties and which looked to permanently equalizing the income of
parties whose earning capacities were substantially different. Rehabilitation alimony was available only to meet a party's reasonable
needs and was based upon a recognition of a responsibility on the
part of the person seeking alimony to do everything in his power to
contribute to his own economic well-being to the greatest extent
possible.4 7 The purpose of rehabilitation alimony was to permit the
spouse with the smaller earning capacity to reach his or her earning potential and to gradually adjust to living without support
from the former spouse. Unlike permanent alimony which focused
on the ascribed expectations of the parties, the focus of rehabilitation alimony was on the reasonable needs of the party seeking alimony and their ability to meet those needs.
Chapter 5 of the 1980 Act governed alimony and support. Section 501(a) of the 1980 Act placed an award of alimony within the
court's discretion only if it found that the party seeking alimony
was in need of rehabilitation.48 Under this section, a party seeking
alimony was in need of rehabilitation if he lacked sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs and if he was unable to
42. See Section 201 of the 1980 Act.
43. See Id.
44. See Chapter 5 of the 1980 Act, Alimony and Support.
45. See Id.
46. Pacella v. Pacella, 342 Pa. Super. 178, 189 (1985).
47. Id. at 190. See also Semasek v. Semasek, 331 Pa. Super. 1, 13 (1984).
48. Section 501(a) of the 1980 Act provided:
The court may allow alimony, as it deems reasonable, to either party, only if it finds
that the party seeking alimony:
(1) lacks sufficient property, including but not limited to any property distributed pursuant to Chapter 4, to provide for his or her reasonable needs; and
(2) is unable to support himself or herself through appropriate employment.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501(a) (Purdon Supp. 1988).
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support himself through appropriate employment."9 Section 501(b)
of the 1980 Act provided a list of non-exclusive factors for the
court to consider in determining, inter alia, whether alimony was
necessary." Section 501(c) provided that an award of alimony had
to be limited in duration to a period of time reasonable for the
rehabilitation of the party seeking alimony. An alimony recipient
49. Id. McNulty v. McNulty, 347 Pa. Super. 363 (1985) (Appropriate employment
means employment that is suited to the expectations and abilities of the parties).
50. Section 501(b) of the 1980 Act provided:
In determining whether alimony is necessary, and in determining the nature, amount,
duration, and manner of payment of alimony, the court shall consider all relevant
factors including:
(1) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the parties.
(2) The ages, and the physical, mental and emotional conditions of the parties.
(3) The sources of income of both parties including but not limited to medical,
retirement, insurance, or other benefits.
(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties.
(5) The duration of the marriage.
(6) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other party.
(7) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because said
party will be custodian of a minor child, to seek employment outside the home.
(8) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.
(9) The relative education of the parties and the time necessary to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking alimony to find appropriate employment.
(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties.
(11) The property brought to the marriage by either party.
(12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker.
(13) The relative needs of the parties.
(14) The marital misconduct of either of the parties during the marriage; however, the marital misconduct of either of the parties during separation subsequent to the filing of a divorce complaint shall not be considered by the court
in its determination relative to alimony.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501(b) (Purdon Supp. 1988).
See also Hess v. Hess, 327 Pa. Super. 279, 289 (1984) (Economic criteria in § 501(b) are to
be used in determining whether § 501(a) is satisfied, while the non-economic criteria, as well
as the economic criteria, are used to determine the nature, amount, duration, and manner of
payment of alimony).
51. Section 501(c) of the 1980 Act provided:
Unless the ability of the party seeking the alimony to provide for his or her reasonable needs through employment is substantially diminished by reason of age, physical,
mental or emotional condition, custody of minor children, or other compelling impediment to gainful employment, the court in ordering alimony shall limit the duration
of the order to a period of time which is reasonable for the purpose of allowing the
party seeking alimony to meet his or her reasonable needs by:
(1) obtaining appropriate employment; or
(2) developing an appropriate employable skill.
23 PA. CONS, STAT. ANN. § 501(C) (Purdon Supp. 1988).
See, e.g., Ruth v. Ruth, 316 Pa. Super. 282, 290 (1983)($400.00 per month for two years was
found to be fairand reasonable in that it provided the recipient with an adequate period of
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was rehabilitated when he was able to provide for his reasonable
needs through the attainment of appropriate employment or the
development of an appropriate employable skill.52 Permanent alimony was allowed only if the party seeking alimony was incapable
of rehabilitation. 3 In addition to awarding alimony for a specified
period of time, alimony could also be awarded to terminate upon
the occurrence of a specific event, such as the receipt of Social Security benefits or the sale of a marital residence and the division of
the proceeds. 4
Shortly after the passage of the 1980 Act, an issue arose as to
whether Section 501(a)5" constituted a threshold test that had to
be satisfied to establish eligibility before the court could consider
the factors contained in Section 501(b),56 in determining whether
alimony was necessary. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania in
Bickley v. Bickley"7 addressed this issue and held that Section
501(a) did not constitute a threshold test. The Bickley court explained that the determination of whether the party seeking alimony lacked sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs
and was unable to support himself through appropriate employment made pursuant to Section 501(a) required "reference to the
specific facts of the case as they fit the relevant factors" enumerated in Section 501(b).5 8 The court stated that the determination
of whether alimony was necessary, required under Section 501(b),
was the logical equivalent to the determination of whether the conditions contained in Section 501(a) were satisfied.5 9 The Pennsyl-

vania Superior Court subsequently reaffirmed the Bickley holding
that Section 501(a) did not constitute a threshold test and that the
factors enumerated in Section 501(b) had to be considered in determining eligibility pursuant to Section 501(a).10 The issue of a
threshold test appeared to be put to rest. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court seriously undermined the certainty regarding
time for adjustments necessitated by the marriage dissolution).
52. See supra, note 51.
53. See supra, note 51. See also Morschhauser v. Morschhauser, 357 Pa. Super. 339
(1986) (Permanent alimony allowed where wife was 60 years old with little employment
experience since marriage and was suffering from various physical ailments).
54. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 373 Pa. Super. 143 (1987).
55. See supra, note 48.
56. See supra, note 50.
57. 301 Pa. Super. 396 (1982).
58. Id. at 406.
59. Id.
60. Hess v. Hess, 327 Pa. Super. 279 (1984).
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that issue a short time later. In Hodge v. Hodge,"1 the court appeared to treat the conditions contained in Section 501(a) as
threshold requirements that had to be satisfied to establish eligibility before the trial court could consider the factors enumerated
in Section 501(b). 2
An award of alimony under the 1980 Act did not need to reflect
all possible future contingencies regarding the circumstances of the
parties. Section 501(e) of the 1980 Act 6 3 provided for modification,
suspension, termination, reinstitution, or a new award of alimony
upon changed circumstances of either spouse of a substantial and
continuing nature." This section expressly recognized remarriage
of the recipient spouse as a change in circumstances sufficient to
terminate the award of alimony.65 The death of the recipient was
also a change in circumstances sufficient to terminate an alimony
award. 6 Absent a contrary agreement, the death of the payor
spouse terminated any award of alimony.6 7 Retirement of the
payor spouse was held to be a sufficient change in circumstances to
allow reduction in the amount of alimony awarded." The payor
spouse could not, however, elect to change his earning potential to
a much lower level in hopes of having the amount of alimony
awarded greatly reduced. 9
Prior to the passage of the 1980 Act, Pennsylvania's divorce law
did not contain any statutory provision authorizing the court to
include as part of the divorce decree an agreement of the parties
for the payment of post-divorce alimony. Any such agreement for
the payment of alimony was a bar to a judicial allowance.7" The
right to payment under such an agreement rested upon the agree61. 513 Pa. 264 (1986).
62. Id. at 274-76 (Hutchinson, J., concurring and dissenting).
63. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501(e) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
64. Section 501(e) of the 1980 Act provided:
Any order entered pursuant to this section is subject to further order of court upon
changed circumstances of either party of a substantial and continuing nature whereupon such order may be modified, suspended, terminated, reinstituted, or a new order made. Any such further order shall apply only to payment accruing subsequent to
the petition for the requested relief. Remarriage of the party receiving alimony shall
terminate the award of alimony.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501(e) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
65. Id.
66. See Chaney v. Chaney, 343 Pa. Super. 77, 82 (1985).
67. See Teribery v. Teribery, 357 Pa. Super. 384, 393 (1986) (citations omitted).
68. McFadden v. McFadden, 386 Pa. Super. 506 (1989).
69. Bickley, supra note 57, at 407.
70. Bloom v. Bloom, 8 Pa. D. 563 (1899).
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ment itself and not upon the marriage.1 An action in assumpsit
was the proper remedy to cure any default in payment due under a
private agreement.7 The 1980 Act recognized and encouraged private alimony agreements. 3 Subject to the court's approval, an
agreement for the payment of alimony could be incorporated and
merged into the divorce decree."' Such treatment brought the
agreement within the statutory definition of alimony 7 5 and made
available the modification and enforcement provisions 76 contained
in the divorce code regarding awards of alimony.7 7
Due to the increased frequency of couples cohabiting out of wedlock, and the financial interdependence typically present in such a
relationship, the General Assembly provided in the 1980 Act for
the termination of an award of alimony in the event an alimony
recipient enters into such a relationship. 8 In construing this provision, the courts have held that more than occasional sexual activity
with the same third party was required to establish cohabitation. 9
Rather, the courts looked for what amounted to a common law
marital relationship between the former dependent spouse and a
third party.8 0 Financial, social, and sexual interdependence were
evidence of such a relationship. 8 ' Cohabitation by the recipient
spouse did not release the obligation to pay alimony created under
a private alimony agreement not incorporated in the divorce decree
unless the agreement so provided. 2
71. See generally Hollman v. Hollman, 347 Pa. Super. 289, 297-303 (1985), rev'd on
other grounds 515 Pa. 288 (1987).
72. Id. at 300.
73. Hollman, supra note 71, at 298.
74. Lee v. Lee, 352 Pa. Super. 241, 245 (1986).
75. The 1980 Act defined alimony as: "An order for support granted by this or any
other state to a spouse or former spouse in conjunction with a decree granting a divorce or
annulment." 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 104 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
76. The provision regarding modification of awards of alimony is contained in 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501(e) (Purdon Supp. 1989). See supra note 64. The provision regarding
enforcement of awards of alimony is contained in 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 503 (Purdon
Supp. 1989).
77. McFadden, supra note 68, at 510.
78. Section 507 of the 1980 Act provided:
No petitioner shall be entitled to receive any award of alimony where such petitioner
has entered into cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex who is not a member
of the petitioner's immediate family within the degrees of consanguinity subsequent
to the divorce pursuant to which alimony is being sought.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 507 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
79. Miller v. Miller, 352 Pa. Super. 432, 439 (1986).
80. Thomas v. Thomas, 335 Pa. Super. 41, 47-48 (1984).
81. Miller, supra note 79, at 439.
82. VanKirk v. VanKirk, 336 Pa. Super. 491, 506 (1984).
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Pennsylvania's divorce law was amended again in 1988.83 Most
notable among the sections of the 1988 Act were those pertaining
to alimony. The General Assembly eliminated the strict rehabilitative aspect of alimony. An award of alimony remained within the
court's discretion.8 4 The prerequisite to the exercise of the court's
discretion, however, was reduced from a finding of the need for
rehabilitation of the spouse seeking alimony, to a finding that alimony was necessary. s5 The two conditions establishing a need for
rehabilitation contained in Section 501(a) of the 1980 Act 8" were
added to Section 501(b) of the divorce code as factors to be considered by the court in its determination of the need for alimony."
83. Act of February 12, 1988, P.L. 66,'No. 13 (hereinafter "1988 Act").
84. Section 3 of the 1988 Act amended Section 501(a) to read:
Where a divorce decree has been entered, the court may allow alimony, as it deems
reasonable to either party, only if it finds that alimony is necessary.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
85. See Id.
86. See supra, note 48.
87. Section 3 of the 1988 Act amended Section 501(b) of the divorce code to provide:
In determining whether alimony is necessary, and in determining the nature, amount,
duration, and manner of payment of alimony, the court shall consider all relevant
factors including:
(1) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the parties.
(2) The ages, and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of the parties.
(3) The sources of income of both parties including but not limited to medical,
retirement, insurance or other benefits.
(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties.
(5) The duration of the marriage.
(6) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other party.
(7) The extent to which the earning power, expenses or financial obligations of
a party will be affected by reason of serving as the custodian of a minor child.
(8) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.
(9) The relative education of the parties and the time necessary to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking alimony to find appropriate employment.
(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties.
(11) The property brought to the marriage by either party.
(12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker.
(13) The relative needs of the parties.
(14) The marital misconduct of either of the parties during the marriage; however, the marital misconduct of either of the parties from the date of final
separation shall not be considered by the court in its determinations relative to
alimony.
(15) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications of the alimony award.
(16) Whether the party seeking alimony lacks sufficient property, including,
but not limited to, property distributed under Chapter 4, to provide for the
party's reasonable needs.
(17) Whether the party seeking alimony is incapable of self-support through
appropriate employment.
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Section 501(c) of the 1980 Act, directing the court to limit the duration of an alimony award to that necessary for rehabilitation, was
entirely deleted under the 1988 Act. The courts were authorized
under the 1988 Act to award permanent alimony if reasonable
under the circumstances." The 1988 Act expressly provided for the
termination of an award of alimony upon the death of the recipient, and upon the death of the payor unless otherwise provided for
in a court order or an agreement between the parties.8 9 This was a
codification of the existing case law addressing the effect on an
award of alimony of the death of either party to the award."

III. A

NEED FOR FURTHER CHANGE

The changes made to Section 501 of the divorce code by the
1988 Act clearly expressed an intention to convert Pennsylvania
from a rehabilitation alimony state to a permanent alimony state.
The change made to subsection (a) removed any past confusion
regarding the issue of threshold requirements in determining eligibility for alimony.9 1 In reducing the prerequisite to the exercise of
the court's discretion in awarding alimony from a finding that the
party seeking alimony is in need of rehabilitation to a finding that
alimony is necessary, the General Assembly has also made available the awarding of reimbursement alimony.9 2 Reimbursement alimony is both equitable and appropriate in cases in which the
spouse seeking alimony is ineligible for rehabilitation alimony, yet
has made substantial contributions to the other spouse's education
and career development during a brief marriage in which minimal
(c) The court in ordering alimony shall determine the duration of the order, which
may be for a definite or an indefinite period of time which is reasonable under the
circumstances.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501(b)(c) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
88. See Id.
89. Section 6 of the 1988 Act added Section 508 which provided:
Upon the death of the payee party, the right to receive alimony pursuant to this
chapter shall cease. Upon the death of the payor party, the obligation to pay alimony
shall cease unless otherwise indicated in an agreement between the parties or an order of court.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 508 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
90. See supra, notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
91. See supra, notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
92. One of the factors to be considered by the courts in determining whether an award
of alimony is necessary is "the contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other party." 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501(b)(6) (Purdon
Supp. 1989).
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marital property was accumulated. 3 An equitable result is
achieved by reimbursing the spouse with an award of alimony sufficient to compensate for the contribution made. 4 If substantial
marital property has been accumulated, economic justice can be
achieved by reimbursing the spouse that so contributed through
the equitable distribution of the marital estate.
The modification of Section 501 of the divorce code allowing for
the award of reimbursement alimony in threshold cases was a step
in the right direction toward assuring the realization of one of the
code's primary goals in dissolving a marital relationship: the effectuation of economic justice between the parties. 5 The modification
of Section 501 of the divorce code replacing rehabilitation alimony
with permanent alimony was a step in the wrong direction, away
from assuring the realization of this primary goal. The concept of
economic justice necessarily entails the recognition of a responsibility on the part of a party seeking alimony to do everything in
his power to contribute to his own economic well-being, to the
greatest extent possible, as soon as possible. Permanent alimony
simply does not acknowledge this responsibility. Recognition of
this responsibility is also more consistent with the primary purpose
behind the dissolution of a marital relationship: the final severance
of the marital tie and the discharge of each party of all derivative
obligations. Permanent alimony, based on the ascribed expectations of the parties and awarded for the purpose of permanently
equalizing the income of parties whose earning capacities substantially differ, is outdated and inherently inconsistent with this primary purpose. Permanent alimony provides a medium for permanent dependence on the part of the recipient spouse and imposes a
perpetual obligation on the part of the payor spouse.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The problems that existed under the divorce code prior to the
passage of the 1988 Act, mainly the uncertainty regarding the issue
of a threshold test for eligibility and the absence of any provision
for reimbursement alimony could have been solved more easily and
93. See, e.g., Hodge, supra note 61.
94. Id.
95. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102(a)(6) (Purdon Supp. 1989) states that it is the policy
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in granting divorces to "[elffectuate economic justice
between parties who are divorced or separated and grant or withhold alimony according to
the actual need and ability to pay of the parties and insure a fair and just determination
and settlement of their property rights." Id.
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in a manner more consistent with sound, modern policy regarding
the awarding of alimony than the solutions to these problems provided in the 1988 Act. By replacing rehabilitation alimony with
permanent alimony, the General Assembly has thrown out the
baby with the bath water. The uncertainty regarding the existence
of a threshold test in establishing eligibility to receive rehabilitation alimony could have been resolved by simply removing the ambiguity contained in Section 501(a) of the 1980 Act and expressly
providing whether or not such a test was to be applied. The absence of any provision for reimbursement alimony could have been
resolved by simply making such a provision along with an indication as to when such an award of alimony was appropriate. An
award of permanent alimony in the event the party seeking alimony was not capable of rehabilitation, as provided in the 1980
Act, could have been retained.
The language of the provisions of Section 501 of the divorce code
regarding the awarding of alimony, as amended by the 1988 Act,
offer very limited guidance for determining when alimony is necessary and appropriate because they do not indicate what weight, if
any, is to be given to the different factors to be considered or the
starting point at which to apply these factors. The court is simply
instructed to determine whether alimony is necessary after considering all relevant factors, including those enumerated in Section
501(b). This instruction is so general that it permits almost unbridled discretion in each judge to determine whether alimony is necessary according to the judge's notions of necessity and economic
justice. Clearly, more guidance and direction is required from the
General Assembly in order for the awarding of alimony to be based
on recognizable and reviewable standards.9 6
The General Assembly could have provided the necessary guidance to insure the awarding of alimony based on recognizable and
reviewable standards by providing for and prioritizing all three
types of alimony: rehabilitation, permanent, and reimbursement.
The General Assembly could also have prioritized the factors to be
considered in determining whether a particular type of alimony
award is appropriate. Prioritization would guide the court in'determining what type or types of alimony to award. It would also provide the starting point at which the court is to apply the relevant
96. See Lee, supra, note 74, at 245. (Review of alimony orders is limited to a determination of whether the lower court committed an abuse of discretion or an error of law.). See
also Mazzei v. Mazzei, 331 Pa. Super. 432 (1984).
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factors enumerated in Section 501(b). Under such a prioritization,
rehabilitation alimony would be the rule and permanent alimony
would be the exception. The court would first determine if rehabilitation was necessary. If so, an award of rehabilitation alimony
would be made. The court would then c6nsider whether reimbursement was necessary, taking into account what was received
through the distribution of the marital estate. If so, an award of
reimbursement alimony could be made. There would be sufficient
flexibility such that if the court found that both rehabilitation and
reimbursement were necessary, an award encompassing both types
of alimony could be made. If the court determined that rehabilitation was necessary, yet not feasible, an award of permanent alimony could be made.
The General Assembly has failed to provide clear guidance and
consistent policy in the latest version of Pennsylvania's divorce
law. The likely result is further inconsistency and confusion in the
courts."7 The General Assembly must reevaluate and clearly define
the policy behind alimony in Pennsylvania. Only then can the necessary guidance be provided which will result in the awarding of
alimony most likely to effectuate economic justice between the parties based on recognizable and reviewable standards.
Patrick M. Coyne

97. See Kludo v. Kludo, No. 89-706 (Pa. Super. Jan. 30, 1990) (LEXIS,States library,
PA file). The court approved an award of permanent alimony to a party that was not in
need of rehabilitation and that had received over $200,000.00 in liquid assets through the
equitable distribution of the marital estate.

